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UNITED NATIONS CITIZENSHIP
LEGAL ASPECTS OF UNITED NATIONS CITIZENSHIP
By S. RAYMOND DUNN*
This article does not purport to deal with the question
of the advantages of United Nations citizenship, "derivative
and dependent upon" allegiance to one's own national sov-
ereignty. The subject of the numerous advantages of the
plan, which, as will be seen, is really not a new idea, but
merely a recognition of an already existing fact, must be
discussed elsewhere. In this paper we limit ourselves to
an inquiry into the matter of legal aspects of citizenship for
individuals in the United Nations.
We are first of all confronted with the fact that many
of the nations of the world are reluctant to permit any
diminution from their sovereignty and independence. Does
not this create a dilemma? A greater measure of world
order is advocated by many thinking persons on the ground
that recent mechanical inventions and improvements, such
as the aeroplane, television and atomic power, have united
the globe into one community, just as, for example, the
invention of gunpowder rendered obsolete the castles of
the feudal nobles and, therefore, made inevitable the de-
struction of feudalism, and as the steamboat, the railroad
and the whole system of national improvements, in the
period surrounding the great decision of Mr. Chief Justice'
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,' united our nation into one
community. As Pope Pius XII has stated,2 mankind has
now attained a "unity of dwelling place". On the other
hand, for numerous reasons, psychological, social, political,
etc., many nations are loath to part with an iota of sover-
eignty.
Is the spirit of the law sufficiently accommodating and
flexible to supply the answer? It is perhaps the noblest
aspect of the law that it has always succeeded in establish-
ing institutions which were the necessary answers to the
* A.B., Johns Hopkins, 1933; LL.B., University of Maryland, 1938; of the
Baltimore City Bar.
'9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
1 NAUGHTON, PIUS XII (1943) 41. citing Sum ma Pontiflcvs 38.
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most basic human needs. The law is now confronted with
the greatest challenge in its history. Can it reconcile the
deeply felt need for world order, which is now nothing
more than order in one community, with the insistence
on the part of nations upon clinging to their respective
sovereignties?
Consequently, it first behooves us to determine whether
or not United Nations citizenship is compatible with na-
tional sovereignty, whether or'not the plan would entail a
divided, inconsistent and possible contradictory allegiance.
Secondly, there arises before us the question of the
Charter of the United Nations. Assuming for the moment
that our first proposition shall be satisfactorily answered,
i.e., that there is no inconsistency between such dual citizen-
ship as is contemplated and national sovereignty, may a
system of United Nations citizenship be established under
the provisions of the existing Charter? Reflection will be
quick to convince us that this is, in the final analysis, a
matter of convenience rather than a fundamental question,
for, if United Nations citizenship is proved to be both
desirable and possible, possible from the standpoint of
general constitutional law, then even the prospect of an
amendment to the Charter might be worthy of considera-
tion. The Charter exists to serve world peace and order
and, if the cause of humanity's peace and order requires
a Charter amendment, then a Charter amendment we shall
have. However, it goes without saying that an amendment
to the Charter, under the terms of Articles 108 and 109
thereof, would be an inconvenient and lengthy task. Such
inconvenience, difficulty and waste of precious time may,
on the other hand, be prevented if United Nations citizen-
ship is within tle contemplation of the present Charter.
As we shall see, no Charter amendment is necessary. All
such plans and institutions as are necessary and proper
are already authorized by the signatory nations, and as a
matter of fact, most of us are citizens of the United Nations
at the present time, despite the fact that only a few of
us are aware of this highly important fact.
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Thirdly, we shall discuss certain aspects of procedural
law concerning United Nations citizenship.
Our disquisition, therefore, is in three portions: (1) Is
United Nations citizenship compatible with national sov-
ereignty? (2) Is such citizenship authorized by the existing
Charter of the United Nations? (3) What are the practical,
procedural steps which are worthy of recommendation?
I. UNITED NATIONS CITIZENSHIP IS COMPATIBLE WITH
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
The United Nations is a Confederation, and citizens of
a member-nation within a confederation may also enjoy
dual citizenship, that of the Confederation, together with
that of the member-nation, without any loss or diminution
of sovereignty on the part of the member-nation. Citizen-
ship in the Confederation is "derivative and dependent
upon" the basic citizenship.
It goes without saying, it is implicit in the very defini-
tion, that a Confederation is a group of sovereign and inde-
pendent States bound together by treaty or compact. As
Willoughby states3 :
"The State is by nature a unity, and is characterized
by the possession of a sovereign political will that is
of necessity a unity. Therefore, all those unions, in
which individual members still possess their sover-
eignty and maintain a continued existence as States,
must be founded upon treaty relations, for in no other
way can sovereign States enter into mutual relations
with each other... A central government may indeed
be created, but its acts look for their validity to the
authority of the individual States, and, when per-
formed, must be considered as the separate acts of each
of the States. Thus when a treaty is formed, accepted
and ratified by a so-called confederate or composite
State, it must be considered as though such a treaty
had been separately made by each of the respective
States in the union."
8 WILLOUGHBY, EXAMINATION OF T14E NATURE OF THE STATE (1896) 243 et
seq.
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The same eminent author further states: 4
"In the Confederacy . . . the individual States re-
tain their character as States, and their relations to
each other are of an international or treaty character.
Consequently, no central State is created, and Sov-
ereignty lies wholly within such individual political
units. What union there is in a Confederacy, is the
creation of the wills of the individual States."
Although it is hardly necessary at this time to consider
academically all the various aspects of the distinction be-
tween the Confederacy and the Federal State, enough has
already been shown to make it appear that the United
Nations is a form of Confederacy or Confederation, estab-
lished by treaty, with a retention of sovereignty on the part
of member states, the powers of the central organization
being merely delegated and strictly enumerated.
Is it legally possible for an individual citizen of a con-
federate State to have direct, personal relations with the
Confederacy itself; can he have dual citizenship; can he
be a citizen of the Confederacy as well as of his own sov-
ereign and independent state? Are there any legal and
historic precedents for such a dual relationship? Both of
these questions must be answered in the affirmative.
Let us consider, by way of example, the Confederate
States of America, the Articles of Confederation which
united our States prior to the Constitution and the British
Commonwealth of Nations.
The Confederate States of America furnishes an ex-
ample of a Confederacy of a particularly emphatic, dramatic
and self-conscious character. Because of historical circum-
stances, great stress was deliberately placed upon the com-
plete sovereignty and independence of each of the member-
states. The actual current of events was in the direction
of separateness rather than, as often happens in the history
of the establishment and development of Confederacies,
such as, for instance, the Swiss Confederation, in the direc-
tion of increasing unity. The member-states were loud
and self-assertive in proclaiming their absolute sovereignty.
-Ibid, 254.
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Consider the Preamble of the Constitution of the Con-
federate States of America: 5
"We, the People of the Confederate States, each
State acting in its sovereign and independent char-
acter . . ."
Nevertheless, this same Confederate Constitution, em-
phasizing as it did the "sovereign and independent char-
acter" of each and every one of the States, still provided
for citizenship in the Confederate States of America.
"Article I, Sec. 2. The House of Representatives
shall be composed of members chosen every second
year by the people of the several States; and the elec-
tors in each State shall be citizens of the Confederate
States, and have the qualifications requisite for electors
of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature;
but no person of foreign birth, not a citizen of the
Confederate States, shall be allowed to vote for any
officer, civil or political, State or Federal.
"No person shall be a Representative who shall
not have attained the age of twenty-five years, and
be a citizen of the Confederate States ... "
"Article I, Sec. 3. .. . No person shall be a Senator
who shall not have attained the age of thirty years,
and be a citizen of the Confederate States..."
"Article II, Sec. 1. .. . No person except a natural
born citizen of the Confederate States, or a citizen
thereof born in the United States prior to the 20th of
December 1860, shall be eligible to the office of Presi-
dent..."
Not only is the meaning entirely obvious in itself, but
its clarity is further emphasized by comparison with the
earlier Constitution for the Provisional Government of
the Confederate States of America, adopted on February
8, 1861, whereas the permanent Constitution was adopted
March 11, 1861. The provisional compact contained a dif-
ferent provision.
'DAvis, THE RxsZ AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT.
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"Article II, Sec. 3 .... No person except a natural-
born citizen of one of the States of this Confederacy
at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall
be eligible to the office of President ... "
Let us now consider the United States of America dur-
ing the period of the Articles of Confederation, from the
final consent, on the part of Maryland, the last of the
individual States to enter in 1781, until the Articles were
superseded by the Constitution in 1789. We deal with
"Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between
the States of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhode-
island, and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York,
New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North-Carolina, South-Carolina and Georgia."
The United States was then unquestionably a Confed-
eracy, and the individual States were fully sovereign:
"Article I. The stile of this confederacy shall be
'The United States of America'.
"Article II. Each State retains its sovereignty, free-
dom and independence ...
"Article III. The said States hereby severally enter
into a firm league of friendship with each other ... "
The Articles contained the provision that the free in-
habitants of each of the States should, as a general rule, "be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in
the several States". The exact text is as follows:
"Article IV. The better to secure and perpetuate
friendship and intercourse among the people of the
different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of
each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives
from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several States;
and the people of each State shall have ingress and
regress to and from any other States, and enjoy therein
all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to
the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the in-
habitants thereof respectively ... "
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It is obvious from the above that the United States
during the period of the Articles, although merely a Con-
federacy, went very much further than creating a dual
citizenship; it went far in the direction of creating a sort
of consolidated citizenship, with all of the practical attri-
butes thereof, i.e. "all privileges and immunities" within
each of the component sovereignties. Article IV of the
Articles of Confederation, which prepared the way for
Article IV, Section 2 (1) of the Constitution, greatly ex-
ceeded the scope of the United Nations citizenship, by
which, of course, is merely meant allegiance to the Con-
federation itself without any reciprocal granting of "privi-
leges and immunities" by the member-sovereignties. In
other words, it goes without saying, each nation will natu-
rally retain complete control over its own immigration
laws, naturalization laws, etc.
A Confederacy is founded, as has been seen, upon a
treaty between sovereign States. Such a treaty is a com-
pact, which in turn is a glorified word for a contract. Just
as contracts between private persons may contain an al-
most infinite variety of provisions, depending upon the
wills of the respective persons who enter into such agree-
ments, so may compacts between States likewise be charac-
terized by a variety of provisions, similarly depending upon
the sovereign wills of the States. In the present era of
world history it is neither necessary nor practicable for
immigration, naturalization, tariff barriers, and the like
to be abolished, and naturally there neither exists nor is
there contemplated any proposal for their abolition or
modification. However, as we shall see, the Charter of
the United Nations does contain provisions granting the
great privilege of United Nations citizenship to individuals.
The Articles of Confederation offer further evidence of
the proposition that, as Willoughby states: 6
".... in the Confederation, law may operate in some
instances directly upon the individual. Thus while we
have been accustomed to distinguish our present Union
Supra, n. 2. 261.
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from that maintained under the Articles of Confedera-
tion upon this ground, as a matter of fact, the rule does
not hold in all cases."
Professor Willoughby then goes on to quote at length
the following significant passage from the Federalist, No.
40, written by James Madison, the Father of our Constitu-
tion:
"In some instances, as has been shown, the powers
of the new government (under the Constitution) will
act on the States in their collective characters. In some
instances also, those of the existing government (under
the Articles of Confederation) act immediately on in-
dividuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post-
office; of coins, weights and measures; of trade with
the Indians; of claims under grants of land, by differ-
ent States; and above all, in the case of trial by court-
martial in the army and navy, by which death may
be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even
of a civil magistrate; in all these cases the powers of
the Confederation operate immediately on the persons
and interests of individual citizens."
There can be, therefore, a direct, immediate relation-
ship between an individual citizen of a member-sovereignty
and the Confederacy itself, e.g. between an individual New
Yorker or New Jerseyite and the United States under the
Articles, or between an individual American or Mexican
and the United Nations.
Before proceeding further to the contemplation of the
British Commonwealth of Nations, we pause to remind our-
selves that, according to the theory of constitutional inter-
pretation of Madison, Jefferson, Taylor of Caroline, Cal-
houn, Hayne, Taney, Davis and others, the Constitution of
the United States itself was a compact between independent
and sovereign States from the time of its ratification until
the final outcome of the War between the States. Senator
Hayne, for instance, spoke of "the sovereignty and inde-
pendence of the States."7 He added: "Sir, I am one of
those who believe that the very life of our system is the
'HAYNE, THE GREAT DEBATE BETWEEN HAYWE AND WEBSTER (1898).
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independence of the States . . .' In the view of this
interpretation, the Constitution during a lengthy period
of the history of the United States established a non-
sovereign central government which was merely the joint
organ of numerous Sovereignties, a Confederacy in other
words. It cannot in all fairness be denied that the opinion
of James Madison, who fathered the Virginia Resolutions,
as well as the Constitution, is entitled to a not inconsider-
able measure of respect. Such a viewpoint would furnish
another example of citizenship in a Confederation.9 Con-
cerning the matter of an oath of fidelity or allegiance to
the central government, which under this "compact" theory
was a Confederation, it was provided, as, of course, it is
still so provided, in Article VI (3) of the Constitution:
"The Senators and Representatives before men-
tioned, and the Members of the several State Legisla-
tures, and all Executive and Judicial Officers, both
of the United States and of the several States, shall
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Con-
stitution ... "
It is interesting to mention in passing that a practically
identical provision appears in Article VI of the Constitution
of the Confederate States.
Let us now consider the British Commonwealth of
Nations.
Prime Minister Attlee, in his Address on Armistice Day
1947 stated: "We are showing the world how freedom and
association in a wider policy can be combined." His state-
ment contains a generous measure of inspiring truth.
The British Commonwealth of Nations is an inter-
national association, which is, juridically speaking, even
looser than a Confederation. For the British Common-
wealth of Nations, unlike such Confederations as the Con-
federate States, the United States under the Articles, the
Germanic Confederation, or the United Nations, has no
central governmental body. Policies are agreed upon at
Ibid.
'U. S. CONST., Art. I, Sec. 2 (2) ; Art. I, Sec. 3 (3) ; Art. II, Sec. 1 (4).
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conferences between the sovereign member-nations of the
Commonwealth.
Nevertheless, there is a form of dual "citizenship", which
is referred to in the language of British constitutional law as
"allegiance to the Crown". In other words, a Canadian citi-
zen bears allegiance to the Crown; so does a subject of the
United Kingdom, an Australian citizen, a New Zealand citi-
zen, etc. By virtue of the Statute of Westminster of 1931, fol-
lowing the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand enjoy full sovereignty within
the British Commonwealth of Nations. Since there is no cen-
tral Government, not even of the vaguest Confederate
nature, it follows that the general pledge of allegiance is
the sole bond between the Sovereignties. In the event of
secession on the part of New Zealand, for example, from
the British Commonwealth of Nations, a New Zealander's
allegiance to the Crown would immediately terminate,
since his loyalty to the sovereign and independent govern-
ment of New Zealand is paramount and primary, and his
allegiance to the Crown is, so to speak, the individual
implementation of his sovereign's international policy.
As is well known, each sovereign nation within the
Commonwealth makes its own laws concerning immigra-
tion, tariffs, etc. This is necessarily the case, since in the
absence of a Confederacy of any kind, there is a complete
absence of contractual provisions concerning the passage
of such laws by even a non-sovereign governing body.
There is nothing perhaps to be gained by a further
multiplication of examples. Enough has been surveyed to
make it clear that individual citizenship in a Confederation,
a jointly created non-sovereign body, in no way detracts
from the sovereignty of the member-states. Since only the
member is sovereign and the central body non-sovereign,
there arises no question whatsoever of divided loyalty.
Citizenship in one's own State is paramount, primary,
original. Citizenship in the Confederation is subsidiary,
secondary, derivative. It depends upon and is the imple-
mentation of the international policy of the Sovereign.
There is, therefore, no.conflict, but cooperation. The loyalty
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UNITED NATIONS CITIZENSHIP
of a Virginian or a Carolinian to the South, was his personal,
patriotic endorsement of the most significant and important
exercise of the sovereignty of his State. The loyalty of
an Englishman or an Australian to the British Common-
wealth of Nations is such a personal, patriotic endorsement.
The loyalty of an American or a Norwegian to the United
Nations will be such a personal, patriotic endorsement.
II. UNITED NATIONS CITIZENSHIP is AuTrInozED BY THE
CHARTER OF THg UNITED NATIONS
A Charter Amendment would be difficult to obtain; it
would require much time and effort. Fortunately, no such
amendment is necessary. Individual citizens of the mem-
ber-states of the United Nations are entitled to citizenship
as the Charter now stands.
In order to consider this question, it is now necessary
for us to leave the field of general constitutional law and to
enter upon the terrain of the law of contracts. For a treaty
is a contract, or compact, although, to be sure, the highest
type of contract, a contract between two or more sovereign
States.10
It is, therefore, in the light of the law of contracts, as
applied to treaties, that we must view the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations which pertain to indi-
viduals.
If we may borrow a phrase from Samuel Adams, let us
pause at the threshold. Let us consider the Preamble of
the great Charter and of the Constitution of the United
States:
The Charter begins: "We, the Peoples of the United
Nations. .."
The Constitution begins: "We, the People of the United
States . .
In both instances, the people are, it appears, made parties
to the instruments. The people are the creators. The
people made the Constitution of the United States. The
'0 CRANDALL, TREATIEs, TrEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT, (2d Ed., 1916),
Sec. 176; Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 271 (1890) , Tucker v. Alexandroff,
183 U. S. 424, 437 (1902) ; Johnson v. Browne, 205. U. S. 309, 317- (1907);
The Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat,. 151, 171 (1821).
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people made the Charter and are making the United
Nations.
Even to one utterly unversed in the language of diplo-
macy, it must certainly seem obvious that the three opening
words of the Charter constitute a most unusual threshold
for a treaty. This must be and is a treaty of a very special
kind. It is a treaty which embraces the people.
A survey of the customary preambles to treaties quickly
and thoroughly convinces us of the correctness of the fore-
going remark. Treaties habitually begin with cold, imper-
sonal formalities. For example, the Treaty of Paris, 1783,
which acknowledged the independence of the United
States: "Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United
States of America and his Britannic Majesty . . ." The
Treaty of 1803 with France concerning the Louisiana Pur-
chase: "The President of the United States of America and
the First Consul of the French Republic . . ." The Treaty
of Ghent, bringing to a close in 1814, the War of 1812:
"Treaty of Peace and Amity Between His Britannic Majesty
and the United States of America . . ." The Treaty with
Spain in 1819, whereby we acquired Florida: "Treaty of
Amity, Settlement and Limits Between the United States
of America and His Catholic Majesty . . ." The Webster-
Ashburton Treaty of 1842, settling then out-standing bound-
ary questions: "Treaty Between the United States of
America and Her Britannic Majesty . . ." The Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, at the close of the Mexican
War: "Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement
Between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States . . ." The Treaty with Russia in 1867,
whereby we acquired Alaska" "Convention Between the
United States of America and His Majesty, The Emperor
of Russia..."
Such is the customary language of diplomacy. As we
shall see, there are a few treaties which constitute note-
worthy exceptions, of which the Charter of the United
Nations is one.
"No word, clause, or provision is presumably redundant;
and effect is, if possible, to. be. given to each of them.
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'Treaties are formed upon deliberate reflection. Diplomatic
men read the public treaties made by other Nations and
cannot be supposed either to omit or insert an article,
common in public treaties, without being aware of the effect
of such omission or insertion.' "",
This is, of course, no startlingly novel proposition. It
is in line, for example, with the familiar principle that
"in interpreting an amendatory act there is a presumption
of change in legal rights."'' 2
As a vivid illustration, let us now contemplate the
sharp contrast between the words, "We, the Peoples of the
United Nations," in the Preamble of the Charter, with the
expectedly formal opening of the Preamble of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, "The high contracting Parties..."
Does the history of the law of treaties afford a similarly
dramatic contrast? There are some examples which come
to mind. They also serve to highlight the differences be-
tween two types of treaties creating confederations, i.e.
compacts of union. Some compacts of union, like the usual
treaty, have States only as their parties. There are, how-
ever, other compacts of union which admit individuals as
well to appear as parties to the instrument. It is in such
cases that individuals become citizens of a confederation,
despite the retention of sovereignty on the part of the
member-States.
The Constitution of the United States, in the opinion
not only of the Confederates, but also in that of the Fed-
eralists of New England (Quincy, Cabot, Pickering and
others), was originally a treaty between sovereign States,
a compact of union. At all events, as we have seen, there
have been citizens of the United States ever since the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution. Under the old Articles of Con-
federation, on the other hand, the people were not made
parties to the instrument, although, as has also been seen,
there were several highly interesting direct connections
between the Confederation and individuals even in that
period.
CRANDALL, op. cit., 8upra, n. 10; The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 419 (1815).
1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d Ed.) See. 1930.
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How do the Articles of Confederation begin?
"To All to Whom These Presents Shall Come, We
the Undersigned Delegates of the States Affixed to our
Names, Send Greeting.
"Whereas, the Delegates of the United States of
America in Congress assembled did on the fifteenth
day of November, in the year of our Lord One Thou-
sand Seven Hundred and Seventy-seven, and in the
Second Year of Independence of America agree to
certain articles of Confederation and perpetual Union
between the States of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-
bay, Rhodeisland and Providence Plantations, Con-
necticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and
Georgia in the words following, viz:
"Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union be-
tween the States of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-
bay..."
It is the cold, impersonal, formal language of a typical
treaty. And then came the Constitution, informal, personal,
intimate: "We the People ... "
There is a similar difference between the Constitution
of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States
of America, which appears to have made no provision for
citizenship in the Confederacy, providing, for example, in
Article II, Section 1, subsection 3: "No person except a
natural-born citizen, or a citizen of one of the States of
this Confederacy at the time of the adoption of this Con-
stitution . . .", and the Constitution of the Confederate
States, ordained and established shortly thereafter.
The Preamble of the provisional constitution was in the
usual treaty form:
"We, the deputies of the sovereign and independent
States of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi and Louisiana, invoking the favor of Al-
mighty God, do hereby, in behalf of these States,
ordain and establish this Constitution for the provi-
sional Government of the same..."
The Preamble of the Constitution of the Confederate
States, which, as has been seen, contained provisions con-
332 [VOL. IX
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cerning citizenship practically identical with those of the
Constitution of the United States, was as follows:
"We, the People of the Confederate States, each
State acting in its sovereign and independent character,
in order to form a permanent Federal Government,
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and se-
cure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our pos-
terity.., invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty
God ... do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the Confederate States of America."
Here again the people were made parties.
What is the contractual significance of the inclusion of
the people in a compact of union between sovereign States,
such as the Constitution of the Confederate States, the
Charter of the United Nations, and the Constitution of the
United States (in the view of Jeffersonian theorists) prior
to the radical change in the basic theory of citizenship
brought about by the Fourteenth Amendment? The con-
tractual significance is simply this: a contract between
States, even more so than a contract between individuals,
since the States are sovereign and the individuals are sub-
ject to the sovereignty of their respective States, may con-
tain any contractual provisions that the contracting parties
may see fit to include. In the Covenant of the League of
Nations, the only parties to the contract were "the high
contracting parties", i.e. the States themselves. In the
Articles of Confederation, individuals were included within
the scope of the compact for certain limited purposes. In
the Constitution of the United States, individuals were
made parties to the compact; they were parties both as
creators and as beneficiaries.
It now behooves us to consider some of the eminent
authorities who have dealt with the meaning of the words,
"We the People".
The phrase was eloquently interpreted by Daniel
Webster, in his reply to Hayne:
"It is, sir, the people's Constitution, the people's
Government, made for the people, made by the people,
and answerable to the people ... We are all agents of
the same supreme power, the people."
1948]
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The words in question were explained by Madison him-
self, one of the most important members of the Constitu-
tional Convention, only a few months after the drafting
of the Constitution. The occasion was the third day of the
Virginia Convention, convoked for the purpose of passing
upon the ratification of the Constitution. Ratification was
opposed by Patrick Henry, who argued:
"What right had they to say, We, the People? My
political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude
for the public welfare, leads me to ask, who authorized
them to speak the language of 'We, the People', instead
of We, the States? States are the characteristics and
the soul of a confederation. If the States be not the
agents of this compact, it must be one great consoli-
dated national government of the people of all the
states."' 3
The next day, Patrick Henry, again arguing on behalf
of the sovereignty and independence of Virginia, added:
"The fate of this question and of America may
depend on this. Have they said, We, the States? Have
they made a proposal of a compact between States? If
they had, this would be a confederation; it is other-
wise a consolidated government. The question turns,
sir, on that poor little thing-the expression, 'We, the
people', instead of the States of America.""
Madison's answer was as follows:
"Who are parties to it (the Constitution)? The
people-but not the people as composing one great
body; but the people as composing thirteen sovereign-
ties . ..15
The people are parties to the Constitution. And the
people are, by the same token, parties of the Charter. Does
history offer a more eminent authority on this proposition
than James Madison?
The main point in the controversy between Henry and
Madison does not, of course, concern us here, i.e. whether
"3 ELLioTrr's DEBATES (1836) 54.
,Ibid, 72.
Ibid, 114.
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the "people" in Preamble of the Constitution composed
one great body or thirteen separate and distinct sovereign-
ties. As history tells us, the fears of Patrick Henry were
fulfilled at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. "We the People"
was ambiguous on this question of whether there was one
or thirteen sovereignties. In the Confederate Constitution
there is no room left for doubt: "We, the people of the
Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and
independent character.. ." Nor is there any ambiguity in
the Charter. "We, the Peoples" make it clear that each
people is looked upon as composing a separate and distinct
sovereignty.
The fact that the Henry-Madison discussion is quoted,
with full approval of Madison's explanation, by Jefferson
Davis,16 proves, incidentally, that the latter, a distingished
authority on the theory and practice of a Confederacy, was
of the opinion that the fact that individuals are parties to
a Confederacy's compact of union does not violate the sov-
ereignty of the member-States.
The cardinal proposition, however, that, by virtue of
the words on the very threshold of our Constitution, the
people are parties thereto, is a principle upon which both
of the two great schools of political thought of our Nation
have apparently always been in accord. This viewpoint has
been expressed, for example, by two Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States in celebrated decisions.
The Chief Justices in question were men who, in other
respects, were of decidedly different outlook; the first was
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall; the other, Mr. Chief Justice
Taney.
Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland,17 stated:
"The government proceeds directly from the people;
is 'ordained and established' in the name of the people;
and is declared to be ordained, 'in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tran-
quillity and secure the blessing of liberty to themselves
and to their posterity'."
"Supra, n. 5, 104-105.
174 Wheat. 316, 403 (1819).
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Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the Court's
opinion in Scott v. Sandford," is even more explicit:
"The words 'people of the United States' and 'citi-
zens' are synonymous terms and mean the same thing."
Does it not follow that, in the Charter the words "Peoples
of the United Nations" and "citizens" are synonymous terms
and mean the same thing? What other rational explanation
would be possible for the presence of such highly unusual
phraseology at the commencement of a treaty, of a com-
pact of union? Citizenship in the United Nations was in-
tended within the meeting of the minds which resulted
in the greatest contract in the history of law.
The insertion of the words, "We, the Peoples of the
United Nations," was proposed by the Delegation of the
United States. The purpose was to emphasize that the
Charter is an expression of the peoples and is primarily
concerned with their welfare.19
The words of Webster are applicable to the present situ-
ation. It is the peoples' Charter, made for the peoples,
made by the peoples. Patrick Henry's eloquence may also
be brought to date-The question turns on that poor little
thing-the expression, "We the peoples", instead of "the
high contracting parties" or formal phraseology of like
nature.
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated :20
"This Court would not readily lean to favor of restricted
construction of language, as applied to the provisions of a
treaty, which always combines the characteristics of a
contract, as well as a law."
Our conclusion is strengthened by a consideration of
the great instrument as a whole.
First, however, let us compare the entire Preamble of
the Charter with the whole of the Preamble of the Covenant
of the League of Nations.
'
8 60 U. S. 393, 404 (1856).
10 GOODRICH AND 11AMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS-COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS (1946) 55.
20 The Bello Corrunes, 8apra, n. 171.
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That of the Covenant:
"The high contracting Parties,
In order to promote international cooperation and
to achieve international peace and security
by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
by the prescription of open, just and honorable rela-
tions between nations,
by the firm establishment of the understanding of
international law as the actual rule of conduct among
Governments,
and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous
respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of
organized peoples with one another,
Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations."
Nations, and Nations only, are made parties to the con-
tract. The agreement is between the "high contracting par-
ties". Within the scope of the compact are "international
cooperation", "international peace and security", "relations
between nations", "conduct among Governments" and
"dealings of organized peoples with one another". The
peoples are mentioned only once and then only as "organ-
ized peoples", i.e. they are contemplated only within the
framework of their respective political organizations.
What a contrast is offered by the Preamble of the
Charter:
"We, the Peoples of the United Nations determined
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow
to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the
equal rights of men and women and of nations large
and small, and
to promote social progress and better standards of
life in larger freedom,
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And for these Ends
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with
one another as good neighbors, and
to employ international machinery for the promo-
tion of the economic and social advancement of all
peoples,
Have Resolved to Combine our Efforts to Accom-
plish These Aims."
These are words which appear upon the threshold of
the greatest Charter in the history of the world. Let us
weigh and assay these words.
"We, the Peoples" has already been analyzed from the
points of view of intrinsic meaning, of contrast with the
customary phraseology of treaties and the consequent evi-
dence of intent to effect a change, and the interpretations
of eminent statesmen and jurists.
It is the peoples who are determined; it is the peoples
who have resolved. The peoples have resolved to combine
"our" efforts.
They are determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war. People have generations. Govern-
ments have no generations. The birth and death of govern-
ments have nothing whatsoever to do with generations.
"... in our lifetime . . ." Here, if ever, are perfect
words of personality. The word "lifetime" can apply only
to individual persons, not to organized peoples, not to
governments, not to states. The Charter is the contract of
the persons of the United Nations, persons who were living
on "the twenty-sixth day of June, One Thousand Nine Hun-
dred and Forty-five" when the great compact of union was
signed in the City of San Francisco.
".... to reaffirm faith ... in the dignity and worth of
the human person..." Here is the voice, in Webster's words,
of the peoples' Charter, for the peoples, by the peoples. Ob-
serve the note of individuality, even the use of the word
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"person" in the singular. The individual person is within
the contemplation of the makers of the Charter.
"... in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small . . ." Men and women come first,
they take precedence over the nations.
It is the peoples who are to practice tolerance and to
live in peace with one another as good neighbors.
The peoples have made the compact. The peoples are
the beneficiaries of the compact.
People, instead of governments, appear also in Article
71:
"The Economic and Social Council may make suit-
able arrangements for consultation with non-govern-
mental organizations which are concerned with matters
within its competence. Such arrangements may be
made with international organizations, and, where
appropriate, with national organizations after consulta-
tion with the Member of the United Nations con-
cerned."
As is stated by Goodrich and Hambro, 21 "this Article
goes one step further, and beyond what has been customary
in the past, in making provision for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with the
matters under discussion". Already, for example, the fol-
lowing non-governmental organizations have been so ad-
mitted: The World Federation of Trade Unions, the Inter-
national Co-operative Alliance, and the American Federa-
tion of Labor.22
The peoples, parties to the Charter, are citizens of the
United Nations, which they have created for the benefit of
themselves. This conclusion appears inescapable. It is a
citizenship which is "derivative and dependent" upon their
respective national citizenships, in exactly the same fashion
as the citizenship of a citizen of the United States, prior to
the Fourteenth Amendment, was "derivative and depend-
ent" upon state citizenship.23
2 Supra, n. 19, 224.
DoLIvEr, THE UmTE NATIONS, 61.
2Arver v. U. S., 245 U. S. 366, 377, 388, 389 (1918) ; Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U. S. 404, 427 (1935).
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III. MATTERS OF PROCEDURE
There remains for our consideration the question of
how the thoughts, aspirations and activities of individual
citizens may be best correlated with the already established
system and work of the United Nations.
Obviously, United Nations' citizens should not remain
unorganized. An organization, such as the United Nations
Citizenship League, will be of inestimable value in playing
a similar part to that of the Committees of Correspondence
in the early days of our own national history, i.e. in dis-
seminating information and suggestions from country to
country, in mobilizing all available resources of manpower,
in advocating worthy legislation and treaties.24 In such a
manner will the peoples become less conscious of mutual
suspicions and antagonisms, and they will learn to live
"with one another as good neighbors."25
At the earliest possible moment, suitable arrangements
should be made, pursuant to Article 71 of the Charter, for
consultation between the Economic and Social Council and
the non-governmental organization in question, the United
Nations Citizenship League.
The absence of a right to vote should not be discourag-
ing. The non-governmental organization, representing well
over a billion citizens, would enjoy enormous respect,
prestige and influence. Again our own national history
affords an analogy; it was provided by the Northwest Ordi-
nance of 1787, re-enacted by the first Congress under the
Constitution, that a delegate from each territory sit in the
Congress of the United States without a vote.26 Puerto
Rico, for example, is so represented in our Congress at this
very day.
Almost immediately an important step forward in the
direction of further progress will be available. Member
governments may provide by treaty for the creation of a
specialized agency, another aspect of the United. Nations'
NHART, FORMATION OF THE UNION (1937) 64.
2See the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.
"HOCKErT, POLITICAL AND SO6mA HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1492,
1828 (1929) 195-197.
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Citizenship League, which can be brought into relationship
with the United Nations, in accordance with Articles 57
and 63.
"Article 57. 1. The various specialized agencies es-
tablished by inter-governmental agreement and having
wide international responsibilities, as defined in their
basic instruments... shall be brought into relationship
with the United Nations, in accordance with the pro-
visions of Article 63.
"Article 63. 1. The Economic and Social Council
may enter into agreements with any of the agencies
referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which
the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship
with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be
subject to approval by the General Assembly."
Member governments, it appears, have already pledged
themselves to do everything within their power to achieve
this purpose, not only by their general ratification of the
Charter but also, more specifically, by Article 56.
"Article 56. All members pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in cooperation with the Or-
ganization for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55."
The establishment by inter-governmental agreement of
such a specialized agency will offer great and far-reaching
advantages. The agency's activities may be coordinated
with those of other specialized agencies, such as the United
Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the
International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Na-
tions' Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), etc.
"Article 58. The Organization will make recom-
mendations for the coordination of the policies and ac-
tivities of the specialized agencies."
"Article 63. 2. It may coordinate the activities of
the specialized agencies through consultation with and
19481 1341
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recommendations to such agencies and through recom-
mendations to the General Assembly, and to the Mem-
bers of the United Nations."
Representatives of the United Nations Citizenship
League, as a specialized agency, may participate, without
vote, in the deliberations of the Economic and Social Coun-
cil and in those of its commissions.
"Article 70. The Economic and Social Council may
make arrangements for representatives of the special-
ized agencies to participate, without vote, in its delib-
erations and in those of the commissions established
by it, and for its representatives to participate in the
deliberations of the specialized agencies."
The scope of the functions and powers already vested
by the Charter in the Economic and Social Council is
tremendous. With the backing of a specialized agency rep-
resenting the vast numbers of citizens, these functions and
powers would acquire enormous practical significance.
"Article 62. 1. The Economic and Social Council
may make or initiate studies and reports with respect
to international economic, social, cultural, educational,
health and related matters and may make recommen-
dations with respect to any such matters to the General
Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and
to the specialized agencies concerned.
2. It may make recommendations for the purpose
of promoting respect for, and observance of, human
rights and of fundamental freedoms for all.
3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission
to the General Assembly, with respect to matters fall-
ing within its competence.
4. It may call, in accordance with the rules pre-
scribed by the United Nations, international confer-
ences on matters falling within its competence."
By means of such procedure, there exists the possibility
of creating a democratic, competent and efficient central
authority for the United Nations. This can be brought
about with a surprising amount of speed. It can, as has
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been seen, be done even on the basis of the Charter as it
now stands, without amendments, although Charter amend-
ments, whenever deemed desirable, will be greatly facili-
tated if advocated and promoted by the sort of specialized
agency herein considered or, for that matter, even by a
non-governmental consultative organization.
World order is too great and too complex a thing to be
brought into being by theory or plan. It can come about
only on the basis of the experiences of mankind. The most
that can be done for the time being is to assist in the creation
of a system of workable and working United Nations citi-
zenship which will make such essential experiences both
possible and inevitable. Such is the principal task of the
United Nations' Citizenship League. Its experiences will
help (to paraphrase the language of the Congress under
the Articles in its resolution of February 1, 1787, convoking
the Constitutional Convention) to render the United
Nations adequate to the exigencies of world order and
the presentation of world peace.
Today it would apparently be premature to provide for
direct popular representation in the General Assembly or
even, perhaps, on the Economic and Social Council. Is
humanity still too immature, psychologically and socially?
At any rate the conditions for our psychological and social
maturation are available. The sooner we begin, the sooner
will come the day when the peoples of the world can
begin to take an active part, through their elected repre-
sentatives, in the conduct of all the affairs of the United
Nations. Just as the tribunes of Ancient Rome, although
at first possessed of no lawmaking powers, were eventually
admitted because of their great influence and prestige, to
membership in the Senate, so will the representatives of
United Nations citizenship be inevitably admitted to Coun-
cil and to Assembly, and to full voting privileges every-
where.
The United Nations, all the world in fact, is waiting for,
is in desperate need of, this tribunitian power, to symbolize
the growing unity and cooperation of mankind and to work
for even greater unity and cooperation.
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Does there remain any lingering doubt as to whether
such a tribunitian institution is chartered (i.e. constitu-
tional) ? James Madison, in the Federalist, No. 40, answered
the question in 1778:
"There are two rules of construction, dictated by
plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The
one is, that every part of the expression ought, if pos-
sible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to
conspire to some common end. The other is, that where
the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less
important should give way to the more important part;
the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than
the end to the means."
Although it cannot even be said of the Charter that
"the several parts cannot be made to coincide", it is impos-
sible to escape the full impact of the statement in the
Preamble of one of the ends for which the peoples of the
United Nations are determined... "to employ international
machinery for the promotion of the economic and social
advancement of all peoples".
As we have seen, it is chartered for the activities of all
the other specialized agencies of the United Nations to be
coordinated with the United Nations' Citizenship League
and with its tribunitian representatives (Articles 58 and
63 (2)) and for those representatives to participate in the
deliberations of the Economic and Social Council as well
as in the deliberations of every one of the Economic and
Social Council's commissions (Article 70).
But this is not all:
The tribuneship can have direct contact with the Gen-
eral Assembly:
"Article 22. The General Assembly may establish
such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the
performance of its functions."
Direct contact between the tribuneship and the Security
Council is similarly available.
"Article 29. The Security Council may establish
such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the
performance of its functions."
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Branches of the tribuneship may be included among
such "subsidiary organs".
It is also important to keep in mind that the United
Nations, unlike the League of Nations, has a judicial branch.
The old Permanent Court of International Justice was not
a part of the League of Nations; it was a separate and dis-
tinct international institution. The new International Court
of Justice, on the other hand, is an "integral part", "the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations".
"Article 92. The International Court of Justice shall
be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.
It shall function in accordance with the annexed
Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice and forms an in-
tegral part of the present Charter. '27
Furthermore, in passing, it appears that the United
Nations, like the United States28 is authorized to have in-
ferior Courts ordained and established from time to time.
It appears from the first sentence of Article 92 of the
Charter, that the International Court of Justice need not
be the only judicial organ of the United Nations, but the
"principal judicial organ". The Charter appears to permit
the establishment of "Other-and subsidiary-judicial or-
gans of a regional or functional character. -2 9
"Article 92. Nothing in the present Charter shall
prevent members of the United Nations from entrust-
ing the solution of their differences to other tribunals
by virtue of agreements already in existence or which
may be concluded in the future."
See also the general provisions of Article 7, Section 2:
"Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary
may be established in accordance with the present
Charter."
Will the tribuneship of the United Nations' Citizenship
League have access to the judiciary? Such access will be
See also, Art. 7.
U. S. CONST., Art. III, Sec. 1.
GOODRICH AND HAMBRO. 8upra, n. 19. 258.
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available by virtue of the provisions pertaining to advisory
opinions.
"Article 96. 1. The General Assembly or the Secur-
ity Council may request the International Court of
Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal ques-
tion.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and special-
ized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized
by the General Assembly, may also request advisory
opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within
the scope of their activities.""
Although the text of Article 96, Section 2, does not
make it entirely clear whether the General Assembly's
authorization must be given in each individual case or
whether an organ or agency may be given a general authori-
zation, the requisite clarity is supplied by the intent of the
framers of the Charter. The technical committee refused
to adopt a proposal which sought to substitute the words
"in each case" for "at any time". 1 In other words, regular
and frequent application by a specialized agency to the
judiciary of the United Nations is within the contemplation
of the Charter. The full historic significance of this aspect
of the rights and activities of United Nations' Citizenship
will be considered in another article.
Enough has already been presented in this third section
of this paper to establish the fact that United Nations'
citizenship has far more than educational and psychological
value-not that educational and psychological value with
nothing in addition would be unimportant. The main inter-
national problems of our age are, in truth, psychological
problems, and, therefore, in the words of the Preamble to
the Charter of the United Nations Educational, Social and
Cultural Organization, since "wars begin in the minds of
men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace
must be constructed". But, let it be repeated and empha-
sized, a great deal more is available under and by virtue
o See also, Art. 65 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
UNC 10, Summary Report of Twentieth Meeting of Committee IV/1,
Doe. 864, IV/1/71, 3-4; GooDICH AND HAMBRO, supra, n. 19, 266.
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of the United Nations Charter; participation in all phases
of the governmental activities of the United Nations, even
in the judicial phase, is available to the Confederation's
citizens.
Of necessity, it has been impossible within the narrow
confines of this paper to accomplish more than the merest
sketching of the international machinery and the nature
of the democratic procedures which are chartered for the
peoples of our great Confederation, the Confederation, if
not of the world, at least of the overwhelming majority of
mankind. It is hoped that numerous matters of detail will
quickly be clarified in subsequent discussions.
It is, in any case, even at this moment, apparent that
the international machinery to be employed by the United
Nations citizenship (by means of its League) is not some-
thing that will take many decades to put into effect. On
the contrary, the mechanism is fortunately so simple,
thanks to the wisdom of the founding fathers of the Charter,
that it can be started within a few months.
Democratic international self-confidence and technical
know-how will both become rapidly strengthened by exer-
cise.
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